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CAN GOD BE FREE? 
William L. Rowe 
The major conception of God in the West is that he necessarily exists and is 
necessarily all-powerful, all-knowing, and perfectly good. Can God, so con-
ceived, be free with respect to the possible world he selects to create? I argue 
that if there is a best creatable world, God is not free to create any world other 
than the best world. I also argue that if for every creatable world there is a bet-
ter creatable world, it cannot be that God exists and is the creator of a world. 
The question, Can God Be Free?, is an important philosophical question. But 
before endeavoring to answer this question, there are two preliminary points 
that must be discussed. The first, and most important, is this: What concep-
tion of God is being presupposed when we ask whether or not God can be 
free? The conception of God presupposed here is the idea of God that has 
been dominant in the major religions of the West - Judaism, Christianity, 
and Islam. The dominant idea of God in these religious traditions is of a 
being who necessarily exists and is necessarily all-powerful, all-knowing, 
and perfectly good. Thus when we ask whether God exists, we here mean to 
be asking whether there is a being who necessarily exists and is necessarily 
all-powerful, all-knowing, and perfectly good. Of course, it is no easy matter 
to say in any precise way just what it is for a being to be all-powerful, £111-
knowing, and perfectly good. Nevertheless, we will presuppose here that 
some plausible account can be given of these attributes. Second, when we 
ask whether God can be free, we need to first ask: "free with respect to 
what?" Clearly, in an important sense God is not free with respect to doing 
evil, for if he were free with respect to doing evil he would be free to cease to 
be perfectly good. But if there is such a being as God he is no more free to 
cease to be perfectly good than he is free to cease to exist, to cease to be £111-
powerful, or to cease to be all-knowing. God is necessarily perfectly good, 
all-powerful, and all-knowing. He is, therefore, not free to cease to possess 
these perfections. Hence, in our question "Can God be Free?" we are not ask-
ing whether God can be free with respect to his essential attributes. For the 
answer to that question is clearly negative. What then are we asking about 
when we ask whether God can be free? We are asking whether God is free 
with respect to creating a world. And one persistent theme in the great reli-
gious traditions of the West is that God does enjoy freedom with respect to 
creating a world. This freedom is thought to be twofold: 
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1. God was free to refrain from creating any world at all; 
and, 
2. God was free to create other worlds instead of the world he did in 
fact create. 
So, supposing there is such a being as God, the question we shall explore 
here is whether God was free not to create at all, and free to have created 
other worlds than the one he has created. If we assume with Leibniz that 
among possible worlds there is one that is best, it is difficult to see how the 
best possible being (God) would be free to create some world other than the 
best. But before we pursue the question of whether God must create the best 
possible world, it will be helpful here to pause in our discussion and try to 
get clearer about the notion of a possible world and some related concepts. 
Often we think that although things are a certain way they didn't have 
to be that way, they could have been different. Suppose we were late get-
ting to class today. We believe, however, that things could have turned out 
differently. Had we not stopped on the way to chat with a friend, for exam-
ple, we almost certainly would have been on time. So, what we may call 
the actual state of affairs, our being late for class, need not have been actual 
at all. Here then we make a distinction between two possible states of 
affairs - ways things might be - and note that although one is actual (our 
being late for class today), the other (our being on time for class) was possi-
ble, it could have been actual instead. The link between possible states of 
affairs that are not actual and our common ways of thinking about the 
world lies in our frequent belief that things could have been otherwise. 
Whenever we correctly think that things could have gone in a way differ-
ent from the way they actually went, we are distinguishing between some 
possible state of affairs that is actual (the way things did go) and some pos-
sible state of affairs that didn't become actual (the way things could have 
gone but didn't). Every state of affairs that is actual is clearly a possible state 
of affairs, one that, logically speaking, could be actual. But, as we've seen in 
the example of our not being late for class, possible states of affairs may fail 
to be actualized. Perhaps, then, we should think of a possible state of 
affairs as one that could be actual and could fail to be actual. But this view 
overlooks a useful distinction philosophers draw between a state of affairs 
that is possible and a state of affairs that is contingent. A contingent state of 
affairs is a possible state of affairs that may be actual or fail to be actual. 
Since a possible state of affairs is one that could be actual, if it is also such 
that it could fail to be actual (like, for example, our being on time for class 
today), then it is a contingent state of affairs. It can be actual and can fail to 
be actual. But some states of affairs are such that although they are possi-
ble, and therefore can be actual, they cannot fail to be actual, they must be 
actual. These possible states of affairs are necessary, not contingent. 
Consider the state of affairs consisting in the number three's being larger 
than the number two. Certainly, this state of affairs is possible - it's not like 
there being an object that is both square and round, an impossible state of 
affairs. So, it is a possible state of affairs. But is it contingent? Could it have 
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failed to be actual. No. The number three's being larger than the number 
two is not just possible, it is also necessary, it obtains in every possible 
world. So, while many possible states of affairs are contingent in that they 
obtain in some worlds but not in others,! many possible states of affairs are 
necessary, they obtain in every possible world. The following diagram 
shows the way philosophers often distinguish among states of affairs. 
STATES OF AFFAIRS 
______ ~----------I----------~------
I I 
POSSIBLE IMPOSSIBLE 
actual in at least some worlds actual in no worlds 
----~------_I------~-----
I I 
NECESSARY CONTINGENT 
actual in every world actual in some worlds and 
not actual in other worlds 
In order to grasp the idea of a possible world it is helpful to consider two 
important relations among states of affairs: inclusion and preclusion. A state 
of affairs S includes a state of affairs S* just in case it is impossible that S 
should obtain and S* not obtain. (For example, Gordie Howe's being the great-
est hockey player of the 20th century includes someone's being the greatest hockey 
player of the 20th century.) S precludes S* just in case it is impossible that S 
obtain and S* obtain. (So, Gordie Howe's being the greatest hockey player of the 
20th century precludes Wayne Gretsky's being the greatest hockey player of the 
20th century.) Following Alvin Plantinga, we can now say what it is for a 
state of affairs to be maximal and, therefore, a possible world. "A State of 
affairs S is ... maximal if for every state of affairs S', S includes S' or S pre-
cludes S'. And a possible world is simply a possible state of affairs that is 
maximal. "2 
Having seen that a possible world is a maximal state of affairs, we can 
now consider what it is for a possible world to be better than some other 
possible world. Some states of affairs may be said to be intrinsically better 
than other states of affairs. For example, following Samuel Clarke we may 
say that there being innocent beings who do not suffer eternally is necessarily 
better than there being innocent beings who do suffer eternally. Of the second of 
these two states of affairs we would say that it is a bad state of affairs, 
something that ought not to be. But the first state of affairs is not a bad 
state of affairs. The basic idea here is that some states of affairs possess 
intrinsic value. That is, they may be intrinsically good, intrinsically bad, or 
intrinsically neutral (neither good nor bad). They are intrinsically good by 
virtue of containing intrinsically good qualities such as happiness, love, 
enjoyment, beauty, good intentions, or the exercise of virtue.3 And states of 
affairs are intrinsically bad by virtue of containing intrinsically bad quali-
ties such as unhappiness, hate, dissatisfaction, ugliness, bad intentions, or 
the exercise of vice. Still other states of affairs, may contain little or no 
intrinsic value. There being stones, for example, is a state of affairs that con-
tains little if any intrinsic value. Such states of affairs are, we might say, 
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intrinsically neutral. But someone's being happy, for example, is an intrinsi-
cally good state of affairs, while someone's being unhappy is an intrinsically 
bad state of affairs. 
One might infer from the preceding paragraph that if God exists, the 
world he creates would not include any bad states of affairs.4 However, 
supposing it would be in God's power to create such a world, there are at 
least two reasons to question this inference. First, as theodicists have 
argued since the time of Augustine, freedom of the will, if not itself a great 
intrinsic good, appears to be indispensable for some of the very important 
goods we know of - freely given love, freely sacrificing for the well-being 
of others, freely chosen acts of charity, etc. Indeed, from the point of view 
of the creator it might well be uninteresting to create beings who are pro-
grammed from the start to worship God, to honor him, to do good to oth-
ers. From the perspective of the creator it may well be better to have beings 
who can freely choose to love and worship or not to love and worship, for 
love and worship that is freely given is of much greater value than love 
and worship that is compelled. But if God does choose to create a world 
with creatures free to do good or evil, the world may include evil as a 
result of some of their free choices.' Second, there is a principle, the Principle 
of Organic Unities/ held by a number of philosophers from Leibniz to the 
present day. According to this principle, the intrinsic value of a whole may 
not be equal to the sum of the intrinsic value of each of its parts. Compare, 
for example, Jones's feeling happy upon contemplating torturing an innocent 
human being with Jones's feeling unhappy upon contemplating torturing an ilmo-
cent human being. The difference between these two states of affairs is that 
the first contains an intrinsically good state Ganes's feeling happy) as a 
part, whereas the second contains an intrinsically bad state Ganes feeling 
unhappy) as a part. But surely the first state as a whole is a much worse 
state of affairs than the second. So, while a given part of a whole may be 
intrinsically good Ganes's feeling happy), the whole of which it is a part 
may be worse for the presence of the good part than it would be were a 
certain bad part Ganes's feeling unhappy) to be in its place. So, for all we 
know, the best world may include some intrinsically bad states of affairs. It 
hardly follows from this consideration that there may be tears in heaven, 
but it does suggest that we should hesitate to conclude too much from the 
mere presence of some tears on earth. For, as we've seen, a state of affairs 
that constihltes an organic unity may be better for the presence of a bad part 
than it would be were the bad part replaced by a good part. So, again, we 
must note that a possible world with some bad parts may be better than a 
possible world with no bad parts. 
We've seen that the good-making qualities (happiness, love, enjoyment, 
beauty, good intention, an exercise of virtue, etc.) figure in states of affairs 
(e.g., someone's being happy, someone's loving another, etc.) that are 
intrinsically good; whereas the bad-making qualities (unhappiness, hate, 
dissatisfaction, ugliness, bad intentions, or the exercise of vice) figure in 
states of affairs (e.g., someone's being unhappy, someone's hating another, 
etc.) that are intrinsically bad. It is important, however, to distinguish the 
intrinsic value of someone's being unhappy from the extrinsic value of 
someone's being unhappy. The intrinsic value of a state of affairs is inher-
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ent in that state of affairs - it necessarily belongs to that state of affairs no 
matter what that state of affairs is a part of or what the circumstances are in 
which it occurs. But the extrinsic value of a state of affairs may change 
from one set of circumstances to another. Sometimes, for example, a per-
son's being unhappy is productive of good, in which case it may be a good 
thing (i.e., it may be extrinsically good) for that person to be unhappy. But 
that doesn't affect the matter of the intrinsic value of someone's being 
unhappy. For it is a good thing that the person was unhappy only in the 
sense of what that person's unhappiness leads to, or is a necessary part of, 
not in terms of its own intrinsic value. Unhappiness, in itself, is always bad. 
In addition, we should not confuse the intrinsic value of a state of affairs 
with the intrinsic value of a state of affairs of which it is a part. As we've 
noted someone's being unhappy on contemplating the undeserved suffer-
ing of others is a better state of affairs than someone's being happy on con-
templating the undeserved suffering of others. But that truth is entirely 
compatible with someone's being happy necessarily being intrinsically bet-
ter than someone's being unhappy. For the intrinsic value of the part, some-
one's being unhappy, must not be confused with the intrinsic value of the 
whole (someone's being unhappy on contemplating the undeserved suffer-
ing of others) of which it is a part. 
Since a possible world just is a maximal state of affairs, its value will 
reflect the values of the states of affairs contained in it. So, possible worlds 
themselves will be intrinsically good, intrinsically bad, or intrinsically neu-
tral. In addition one possible world will be intrinsically better than, equal 
to, or worse than another possible world. And, as Leibniz noted, it is by 
knowing the intrinsic values of the possible worlds that God is guided in 
his choice of a world to create. 
We are now in a position to consider seriously our question: Is God free 
with respect to creating a world? Assuming that God exists, this question 
falls into two parts: (1) Was God free to refrain from creating any world at 
all?; (2) Was God free to create other worlds instead of the world he did in 
fact create? Let's begin with our second question. We earlier noted that pos-
sible worlds can be ranked according to their value all the way from bad 
worlds, to neutral worlds, and then to good worlds. Suppose then that God 
chooses to display his goodness and power in creating a world. We can 
imagine God, as it were, surveying all these worlds and deciding which one 
to create. He considers all the bad worlds, the neutral worlds (neither good 
nor bad) and all the good worlds. Let's suppose, along with Leibniz and 
Samuel Clarke, that the series of increasingly good worlds culminates in the 
best possible world, a world than which no possible world is as good or bet-
ter. Similarly, we can suppose that the series of increasingly bad worlds cul-
minates in a world than which no possible world is as bad or worse.? Faced 
with choosing from among these two series of worlds the world he shall 
create, it is obvious that an infinitely good being would not, indeed could 
not, create one of the bad worlds. Which good world would he then create? 
Again, it seems obvious that he would create the very best world, the best 
of all possible worlds. As Leibniz points out: since "to do less good than one 
could is to be lacking in wisdom or in goodness," the most perfect under-
standing" cannot fail to act in the most perfect way, and consequently to 
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choose the best."s In a well-known essat Robert Adams has argued on the 
basis of the doctrine of divine grace that God would not be morally obligat-
ed to create the best world that he can. But even if his argument is success-
ful, it still may be necessary for God to create the best world he can. It just 
won't be his moral duty.lO In short, his creating the best world may be a 
supererogatory act, the morally best act he can do, even if his failure to do it 
would not be a violation of his moral duty. And it appears to be inconceiv-
able that a supremely perfect being would act to bring about less good than 
he can. On the assumption that God (the supremely perfect being) exists 
and that there is a best, creatable world, we've reached the conclusion that 
God is neither free not to create a world nor free to create a world less than 
the best creatable world. Indeed, God would of necessity create the best of 
the creatable worlds, leaving us with no basis for thanking him, or praising 
him for creating the world he does. For given that God exists and that there 
is a best creatable world, God's nature as an omnipotent, omniscient, per-
fectly good being would require him to create that best world. Doing less 
than the best he can do - create the best creatable world - would be incon-
sistent with his being the perfect being he is. 
But what if there is no best world? What if, as Aquinas thought to be 
true, for each creatable world there is a better world that God can create 
instead ?11 In short, there is no best world. Here, I believe, in supposing that 
God exists and creates a world when for every creatable world there is a 
better creatable world, we are supposing a state of affairs that is simply 
impossible. I'm not suggesting here that there is an impossibility in the 
idea that God exists. Nor am I suggesting that there is an impossibility in 
the idea that for every creatable world there is a better creatable world. I 
am suggesting that there is an impossibility in the idea both that God exists 
and creates a world and that for every creatable world there is a better cre-
atable world. For whatever world God would create he would be doing 
less good than he can do. And it is impossible for God to do less good than 
he can. The underlying principle yielding the conclusion that there is an 
impossibility in the idea both that God creates a world and that for every 
creatable world there is a better creatable world is the following: 
If an omniscient being creates a world when there is a better world it 
could create, then it would be possible for there be a being morally 
better than it. 
Since God is a being than which it is not possible for there to be a morally 
better being, it is clear, given both the principle just cited and the no best 
world hypotheSis, that God could not exist and be the creator of a world. For 
any being that exists and creates a world when there is a better world it 
could have created instead is, according to the principle cited above, a being 
than which a morally better being is possible, and, therefore, not the best 
possible being. So the issue now before us is whether this principle (if an 
omniscient being creates a world when there is a better world it could create, 
then it would be possible for there to be a being morally better than it) is 
indeed true. My own view is that the principle in question will appear to 
many to be plausible, if not self-evident. For if an omniscient being creates a 
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world when it could have created a better world, then that being has done 
something less good than it could do (create a better world). But any being 
who knowingly does something (all things considered) less good than it 
could do falls short of being the best possible being. So, unless we find some 
reason to reject the principle stated above or a reason to reject the line of 
argument supporting it, we are at the very least within our rights to accept it 
and use it as a principle in our reasoning. But the result of using this princi-
ple in our reasoning about God and the world is just this: if the actual world 
is not the best world that an omnipotent, omniscient being could create, God 
does not exist. God does not exist because were he to exist and create a 
world when there is a better world he could have created instead, then he 
would be a being than which a better being is possible. For he himself would 
have been a better being had he created a better world. But since it is not pos-
sible for any being (including God) to be better than God (the best possible 
being) in fact is, the world God has created must be the very best world he 
could have created. Therefore, if God does exist and creates a world W, W is 
the very best among the worlds that God could have created. W is the best 
creatable world. Hence, we see the problem of no best creatable world. For if 
for every creatable world there is a better creatable world and our principle 
is true, God does not exist. What then can be said against the principle: if an 
omniscient being creates a world when there is a better world it could create, 
then it would be possible for there to be a being morally better than it? 
We may begin by considering the view set forth by Norman Kretzmann 
in his perceptive study of Aquinas's view of creation. In the course of his dis-
cussion of Aquinas, Kretzmann concludes with Aquinas that for any world 
God might create there is a better world he could create. (His disagreement 
with Aquinas concerns only whether God is free not to create at all.) 
Kretzmann's second conclusion - the one presently of interest to us - is that 
it is a mistake to think. (as I do) that if God exists and cannot avoid choosing 
something less good than he could choose, then God cannot be essentially 
perfectly good. And he proceeds to explain why he thinks it is a mistake. 
Like Aquinas, I think that the logical truth that God's actions conform 
to the principle of noncontradiction entails no limit on his power. 
And if it would be a violation of the principle of noncontradiction for 
God to create a world better than any other world he could create, 
then a fortiori that logical truth which does not diminish his power 
also leaves his goodness undiminished. God's being that than which 
nothing better can be conceived of cannot entail his producing a 
world than which none better can be conceived of. No matter which 
possible world he actualizes, there must be infinitely many possible 
worlds better than the actual world in some respect or other.12 
Kretzmann relies on what he takes to be an analogy or parallel between 
power and goodness. His idea is this. Since we agree that failure to bring 
about what is logically impossible does not imply any limit on God's 
power, we should also agree that failure to bring about what is logically 
impossible does not diminish God's goodness. Given that there is no best 
possible world, Kretzmann points out that it is logically impossible for God 
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to create a world better than any other world he could create. So, the fact 
that God does not create such a world diminishes neither his power nor his 
goodness. And that being so, Kretzmann sees no difficulty in God's being 
perfectly good and creating a world less good that other creatable worlds. 
Perhaps we can view Kretzmann as appealing to the following principle: 
A. If S is a logically impossible state of affairs, then the fact that a 
being does not bring about S does not entail that the being in ques-
tion lacks power or perfect goodness. 
This principle strikes me as self-evidently true. The fact that God fails to do 
what logically cannot be done is a bad reason to think that God is morally 
imperfect or lacking in power. On Aquinas's view it is logically impossible 
for God to create the best possible world. And since he cannot do that, the 
fact that he doesn't do it, as Kretzmann notes, implies no imperfection in 
God. I entirely agree with Kretzmann's point on this. But the fact that there 
is a bad reason to conclude that God is not perfectly good does not mean 
that there is no good reason to conclude that God is not perfectly good. 
And the fact that God fails to do what logically can be done may be a good 
reason to conclude that God is not perfectly good.13 The principle that pro-
vides this good reason is the principle we've already introduced and will 
now refer to as "Principle B." 
B. If an omniscient being creates a world when there is a better world 
that it could have created, then it is possible that there exists a being 
morally better than it.14 
If B is true, as I think it is, and if it is also true that 
C. If a being is essentially perfectly good then it is not possible that 
there exist a being morally better than it, 
then if it is true that for any creatable world there is another creatable 
world better than it, it is also true that no omnipotent, omniscient being 
who creates a world is essentially perfectly good. Moreover, if we add to 
this Kretzmann's first conclusion that a perfectly good, omnipotent, omni-
scient being must create, it will follow that there is no omnipotent, omni-
scient, perfectly good being. 
Suppose Aquinas and Kretzmann are right in believing that for any cre-
atable world there is another creatable world that is better than it. Our sec-
ond objection emerges when we consider what the theistic God is to do in 
this situation. If some creatable world is better than any world God alone 
inhabits, then, on my principle B (slightly extended) it appears that God 
must create some world. On the other hand, as we've just seen, on my 
principle B it also follows that he cannot create a world if some other creat-
able world is better. "So", the objector now concludes, "on your principle 
B it follows that God must create a world and also must not create a world. 
Surely, then, since your principle leads to a contradiction, however plausi-
ble principle B sounds, we must reject it." 
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My response to this objection is that on the supposition that for every 
creatable world there is another world that is better than it, principle B 
does not lead to a contradiction. What principle B leads to is the conclusion 
that there is no essentially omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly good being. 
But is principle B true? Daniel and Frances Howard-Snyder have 
endeavored to refute principle B by inviting us to consider three hypothet-
ical world creators: Jove, Juno and Thor.'S They suppose Jove to be an 
omnipotent, omniscient being who is confronted with an infinite number 
of increasingly better possible worlds from which to select one to create. 
Jove, they suggest, decides to create one of these good worlds by using a 
randomizing device. Being good, Jove has no interest in creating a world 
that isn't good. II> Each of the infinite number of good worlds is assigned a 
positive natural number beginning with 'I' for the least good world, '2' for 
a slightly better world, and so on. Jove uses the randomizing device to pick 
one of these good worlds, and, as a result, world no. 777 is created. Now, 
of course, Jove could have created a better world. But the Howard-
Snyders think that it does not follow from this fact that Jove is morally sur-
passable. That is, from the fact that Jove could have created a better world 
than the world he did create (no. 777), they think that it does not follow 
that it is logically possible for there to have existed a being with a degree of 
moral goodness in excess of Jove's.17 
In a response to their article!8 I suggested the following: 
In support of their view the Howard-Snyder's invite us to consider 
other possible omnipotent, omniscient'9 world creators, Juno and 
Thor, and argue that although they produce morally better worlds 
than Jove, they are not morally better creators. Juno does just what 
Jove did but her randomizing machine happens to select a better 
world, no. 999. Thor doesn't use a randomizing machine but selects 
world no. 888 over Jove's world no. 777 because he sees that it is bet-
ter and prefers creating no. 888 to creating any lesser world. Even 
though Juno ends up producing a better world than Jove, the 
Howard-Snyder's are dearly right in viewing Jove and Juno as 
morally equivalent. For had her randomizing macrune hit on world 
777, rather than world 999, Juno would have created world 777. So, it 
was blind luck, not a higher standard of selection, that resulted in 
Juno's selection of world 999. But what of Thor? From their discus-
sion it would seem that Thor is morally superior to Jove and Juno, for 
it looks as though Thor's degree of moral goodness is such that he is 
not prepared to settle for world no. 777 unless he is unable to create a 
better world. But the fact that Jove intentionally included worlds 
numbered 1 - 777 as possibilities for selection by his randomizing 
machine shows that Jove is morally prepared to settle for any of the 
worlds from 1 - 777 even though he is able to create a better world.20 
So, it does appear that, other things being equal, Thor is a morally 
better being than Jove.21 
In a subsequent article22 against principle B, the Howard-Snyders ques-
tion my account of Thor, suggesting that it is incoherent. They wonder 
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what principle or reason Thor acts on. They say: 
For example, suppose Thor's reason is this: worlds numbered 888 
and higher are better than worlds numbered 887 and lower. (This 
seems to be the reason that Rowe has Thor act on. See the quotation 
above.) This reason relies on the general principle that if world w is 
better than world w-t then w-I is unacceptable for creation. Any 
being who accepted an instance of this principle when it involved the 
world no. 888 but did not accept other instances of it would be irra-
tional, and hence not essentially omniscient. Any being who accepted 
the principle in its full generality would be led never to create, given 
(as we are supposing) that for each world there is a better.23 
This leads them to suggest that my account of Thor is incoherent. But I 
believe it is clear from my article that I do not have Thor act on the princi-
ple "don't create if there is a better creatable world/' for such a principle, 
given that for any world there is a better, can only result in Thor's not cre-
ating any world at all. Since Thor is omniscient and does in fact create world 
888, it logically follows that he cannot act on the principle that they suggest 
I have him act on. Of course, while Thor, given his infinite intelligence, 
cannot act on such a principle, it doesn't follow that with finite intelligence 
I cannot make the mistake of attributing to Thor such a principle of action 
when he creates world 888. So, what principle do I have Thor act on? I 
believe that the principle on which Thor acts is very much like the princi-
ple on which Jove acts. Let's look again at Jove. Some worlds he sees as not 
good enough to be acceptable as candidates for creation. The worlds that 
are acceptable to him in terms of his own degree of goodness are then 
ordered in terms of increasing goodness, and one of them, world 777, is 
randomly selected for creation. Thor, as I have described him, does pretty 
much the same thing. The difference is that worlds I - 800 are insufficiently 
good to be acceptable to him as candidates for creation, given that there are 
better worlds he can create. The worlds that are acceptable to him in terms 
of his own degree of goodness are then ordered in terms of increasing 
goodness and one of them, world 888, is randomly selected for creation. I 
conclude that the description the Howard-Snyder's give of Jove is logically 
consistent with there being a being who is better than Jove. And the story 
we have told about Thor is consistent and, if true, gives us reason to 
believe that Thor is a better being than Jove. 
Can we state the principles on which both Jove and Thor act, and 
explain how it is that although they act on the same principles, they pro-
duce worlds that differ in their degree of goodness? I suggest that Jove and 
Thor may act on the following principles: 
PI: Do not create any world that is not a good world. 
P2. Do not create any good world whose goodness is less than what 
one judges as acceptable, given that one can create a better world. 
Clearly, both Thor and Jove act in accordance with PI and P2. Neither is 
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prepared to create a less than good world. And neither is prepared to cre-
ate a good world whose degree of goodness is less than what he judges as 
acceptable in a world, given that he can create a better world. The differ-
ence between them is this. Jove's standard of goodness in world creating is 
such that he is prepared to settle for any good world even if there is a better 
that he can create. Thor, however, has a higher standard. He is not pre-
pared to create any of the good worlds from WI to W800 provided there is a 
better world that he can create. Of course, Thor's allegiance to P2 does not 
preclude him absolutely from creating, say, W777. It prevents him only on 
the condition that there is a better world he can create. Gala apples taste 
much better than Jonathan apples. I know that, and my standard of apple 
selection is never to come home with Jonathan apples when Gala are avail-
able. But that doesn't mean I won't or can't select Jonathan apples when 
Gala apples are not available. A good apple, even if it's a Jonathan, is better 
than no apple at all. 
In their article the Howard-Snyders suppose that it cannot be that Thor 
and Jove act on the same principle. They suppose that if my story about 
Thor being better than Jove is correct then Thor must be acting on a higher 
principle than the principle on which Jove acts. And, since there will be 
worlds better than the world Thor creates, they then conclude that "there is 
another principle which treats as unacceptable some of the worlds which 
were treated as acceptable by Thor's principle, and that other principle is 
such that there is a third principle which treats as unacceptable some of the 
worlds which were treated as acceptable by the second, and so on, ad infini-
tum." Lacking a proof of the impossibility of such an infinite array of 
world-creating principles, they say, 
It seems odd to say the least that there should be infinitely many such 
general principles. At least we see no reason to accept that there are.24 
As I've tried to make clear above, the story I tell is quite consistent even if 
there is no such infinite progression of world-creating principles. Principles 
PI and P2 will suffice so long as for any being in the position of Jove or Thor 
there is another being whose degree of goodness is such that its application 
of PI and P2 results in the selection of a better world to create. And if we 
allow, as the Howard-Snyders do, an infinite number of possible worlds 
beginning with Jove's good world WI, why not allow the possibility of an 
infinite series of good world creators each being better than the preceding 
one. Indeed, why not allow, if needed, an infinite number of different but 
related world-creating principles. But, as I've suggested, I don't see the 
necessity of supposing that my story is coherent only if there is an infinite 
number of distinct world-creating principles. But suppose an infinite num-
ber of such principles is required. Perhaps it is odd at that there should be 
infinitely many world-creating principles. But even if it is odd, we should 
note that oddness and impossibility are far different matters. Many 
extremely odd things are logically possible. And if it is logically possible 
that there is an absolutely infinite number of increasingly better worlds, 
why should it be impossible that there be an infinite number of principles of 
world creation? In any case, however, I see no reason to think that there 
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need be an infinite number of such principles in order for the story of Thor 
and Jove to be coherent. Indeed, I have suggested that Jove and Thor can act 
on the very same principles. Moreover, since it is possible that there be 
world creators whose degrees of goodness increasingly exceed Thor's, it is 
possible that the very same principles would result in increasingly better 
beings creating increasingly better worlds than Thor's world. 
The fundamental question at issue in the discussion concerning Jove 
and Thor is this: Is it logically possible both that for any creatable world 
there is a better creatable world and that there exists an omnipotent, omni-
scient, perfectly good being who creates one of these creatable worlds? My 
position is that it is not possible that both should be true. 
Why do I hold this position? I hold it because, as I've stated earlier, I think 
the following [Principle B] is necessarily true. 
B. If an omniscient being creates a world when it could have created 
a better world, then it is possible that there be a being morally better 
than it.S 
By telling their story about Jove, the Howard-Snyder's hoped to cast doubt 
on Principle B. I believe that my alternative story about Thor undermines 
their attempt. Where does this leave us? I assert that B is necessarily true. 
Many theists assert the following [Principle A] to be true. 
A. It is logically possible both that for any creatable world there is a 
better creatable world and that there exists an omnipotent, omni-
scient, perfectly good being who creates one of these worlds. 
Both of us cannot be right. But how can we hope to settle the question of 
who has the more plausible position? Are we simply at a stalemate, a situa-
tion where neither can show the other's position to be implausible without 
employing as a premise one of the principles that is at issue in the debate? I 
believe that the Howard-Snyder's have endeavored to advance the debate 
in a way that does not beg the question. They suppose both that Jove is an 
omnipotent, omniscient creator of a good world (# 777) and that for every 
creatable world there is a better, but leave as an open question whether 
Jove's goodness can be unsurpassable. The question then is whether we 
have some good reason to think that an omnipotent, omniscient creator of 
a better world than # 777 may be better than Jove. As we've seen, the 
answer depends on the reason such a being has for creating a better world 
than # 777. If such a being (their Juno), given her degree of goodness, 
judges as acceptable for creation the Sa11'l£ worlds as Jove, then the fact that 
her randomizer selects world # 999 for creation gives us no reason at all to 
think that Juno is a better being than Jove, even though she ends up creat-
ing a better world than does Jove. But if, like Thor, the being's degree of 
goodness is such that he judges that worlds of lesser value than # 800 are 
unacceptable candidates for creation, then the fact that its randomizer 
selects world # 800 or higher gives us reason to think that Thor is a better 
being than Jove. Of course, if we had simply concluded that Jove's good-
ness is surpassable because Jove could have created a world better than # 
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777, this would have been to beg the question at issue. For we would have 
been appealing to Principle B to rule out Jove being an unsurpassably good 
being. But no such appeal was made in reasoning to the conclusion that 
Thor is a better being than Jove. 
Principle B, if true, does not refute theism. But if both principle B and 
theism are true, then the world we live in is an unsurpassably good world 
- no possible world that an omnipotent being could have created would be 
better than the actual world. I suspect that part of the motivation for the 
theist to accept the view that there is no best creatable world is that the 
alternative seems (1) to limit severely God's freedom in creating, and (2) to 
leave the theist with the burden of defending the Leibnizian thesis that this 
world, with all its evil, is a world than which a better creatable world is not 
even a logical possibility. 
Thomas Morris, like the Howard-Snyder's and Kretzmann, thinks that 
among the worlds creatable by God there is no best world. He notes two 
difficulties in the Liebnitzian idea that there is a best possible world. First, 
he points out that some philosophers are doubtful that there is a single scale 
on which all creaturely values can be weighted so as to determine what 
world possesses the maximum amount of value. "Some world A might be 
better than rival world B in some respects, but with B surpassing A in oth-
ers, and the relevant values not such that they could be summed over and 
compared overall."26 In short, if some valuable states of affairs are incom-
mensurable with other valuable states of affairs, it may be impossible to 
rank the states of affairs in terms of one being better than, worse than, or 
equal to the other. And if that should be so, we could have two worlds such 
that neither is better than the other, worse than the other, or equal in value 
with the other. Second, Morris notes that a number of philosophers have 
thought that for any world containing "a certain number of goods, n, there 
is always conceivable a greater world with n + 1 goods, or good creatures. 
So, on the simplest grounds of additive value alone, it seems impossible 
there could be a single best possible world. And without this, of course, the 
Leibnizian demand collapses."27 But Morris's main concern lies elsewhere. 
Like the Howard-Snyders and Kretzmann, Morris wants to show that there 
is no incoherence in the idea of a perfectly good creator creating a world 
when there is no best world for that being to create. 
For just as it seems initially very natural to suppose that a superla-
tively good, wise, and powerful being will produce only an unsur-
passable perfect creation, so likewise it can seem every bit as natural 
to suppose that an incoherence or impossibility discovered in the lat-
ter notion indicates an incoherence or impossibility buried within the 
former. 28 
Since it is just that incoherence we have been arguing for, it is important to 
note Morris's efforts to show that the incoherence in question is imagined, 
and not real. Noting that Quinn holds that in the no best world scenario a 
creator of a world is such that "it is possible that there is an agent morally 
better than he is, namely an omnipotent moral agent who actualizes one of 
those morally better worlds," and Rowe holds "if a being were to create a 
418 Faith and Philosophy 
world when there is a morally better world it could create, then it would be 
possible for there to be a being morally better than it,"Morris states that 
these views are "absolutely unacceptable to traditional theists, for whom 
both perfection and creation are important ideas."29 
In developing his objection to the views expressed by Quinn and Rowe, 
Morris introduces a useful thesis - the Expression Thesis: The goodness of an 
agent's actions is expressive of the agent's goodness. I'm inclined to take some-
thing like this thesis as underlying the claim expressed in principle B: If an 
omniscient being creates a world when it could have created a better 
world, then it is possible that there be a being morally better than it. Of 
course, the expression thesis depends on what Morris may well have sup-
posed: that the agent's motive for performing the good action is to bring 
about a good state of affairs. Without supposing that motive we have no 
reason to think that the goodness of an agent's action - measured in terms 
of the quality of its result - is expressive of the agent's goodness. But what 
are we to say of a being who performs an action that he knows will bring 
about less good, all things considered, than he could have brought about 
by performing a slightly different action? In this case, applying the expres-
sion thesis, we should conclude that the agent's degree of goodness is 
something less that it could be. For the agent has acted to bring about less 
good than he knew would have been brought about by his performing a 
slightly different action. But clearly, if an agent knowingly acts to bring 
about less good overall than he could have brought about by performing a 
slightly different action that was in his power to perform, that agent's 
degree of moral goodness is somewhat less than it could be. And it is pre-
cisely this point that underlies the judgment that in the no best world sce-
nario it is impossible for the creator to be perfectly good. For, as we saw in 
the discussion of the Howard-Snyder's story about Jove, Juno, and Thor, 
when a being creates a world that is less good than another world it could 
have created, the world it creates will satisfy its standard of world-creating, 
even given that it could create a better world. But then it is possible that 
there should be a being whose degree of goodness is such that it will not 
create that less good world given that it is able to create a better world. So, 
again I conclude that if a being creates a world when it could have created 
a better world, then it is possible that there should be a being morally bet-
ter than it. And from this it follows that if for every creatable world there is 
a better creatable world, there is no absolutely perfect being who creates a 
world. And since it is better to create a good world rather than not create 
any world at all, on the no best creatable world scenario there is no maxi-
mally perfect being. 
Morris's basic mistake, I believe, is his view, shared by Kretzmann, that 
to hold, as I do, that if there is no best world for a being to create then no 
being can create a world and be a being than which a better creator is 
impossible, just is to hold God accountable for not doing what is logically 
impossible to be done - creating the best world. Thus Morris writes: 
If you and I do less well than we're capable of doing, then those 
around us may conclude, and may sometimes justifiably conclude, 
that we are not at the level of goodness that could be exemplified. But 
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failing to do the best you can is a flaw or manifests an incompleteness 
in moral character in this way only if doing the best you can is at least 
a logical possibility. If doing the best he can in creating a world is for 
God an impossibility, ... then not doing his best in creating cannot be 
seen as a flaw or as manifesting an incompleteness in the character of 
God. The notion of a perfect expression of an unsurpassable character 
would then itself be an incoherence.30 
Of course, if it is logically impossible for there to be a best world, then 
God's not creating the best possible world does not count against his per-
fect goodness. Nowhere do I suggest that it does. What counts against 
God's perfect goodness (specifically, his moral perfection) is his creating a 
world when he could have created a world better than it. The charge is not 
that a being who fails to do what is impossible to be done (create the best 
world when there is no best world to be created) is lacking in perfect good-
ness. The charge is that a being who creates a world when it could have 
created a better world is less than supremely perfect. And the plain fact is 
that if there is no best creatable world then God, if he creates a world, will 
create a world than which he could have created a better world.31 Morris 
simply fails to address the issue at stake here. 
It is important to distinguish three different principles: 
a. Failing to do the best one can is a defect only if doing the best one 
can is possible for one to do. 
b. Failing to do better than one did is a defect only if doing better 
than one did is possible for one to do. 
c. Failing to do better than one did is a defect only if doing the best 
one can is possible for one to do. 
Both (a) and (b) are true. But (c) is not true. And it is (c) that Morris needs 
to make his argument work. 
Suppose, for the moment, that you are an omnipotent, omniscient being 
and are contemplating the infinite series of numbers: 1,2,3,4, etc., etc. You 
are also contemplating the infinite series of creatable worlds containing 
creatures that are overall good worlds, as opposed both to bad worlds and 
neutral worlds - worlds that are neither good nor bad. You let each of the 
numbers represent the overall degree of good that a possible world pos-
sesses, where '1' represents the least good world - a world with no pain 
perhaps, and just one momentary experience of pleasure on the part of 
some lower animaL '2' represents the possible world that is one degree bet-
ter than the world 1, '3' represents the possible world that is one degree 
better than the world 2, etc., etc. Being omniscient you see that there is no 
best possible world for you to create. Just as the series of natural numbers 
increases infinitely so does the series of increasingly better worlds from 
which you will select one to create. Seeing that there is no best possible 
world to create, you realize that no matter how good a world you create 
there will be better worlds you could have chosen to create instead of it. 
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Glancing at world 1, and comparing it with world 1000, you see that world 
1000 is significantly better than world 1, just as you see that world 1000,000 
is significantly better than world 1000. Nevertheless, in spite of noticing the 
enormous disparity between the least good world and the goodness of 
some worlds numerically much greater, you decide that you will create the 
least good world and proceed to actualize world 1. Isn't it obvious that in 
deliberately choosing to create the least good of the infinite series of increas-
ingly better possible, creatable worlds you display a degree of goodness in 
world-creating that is inconsistent with perfect goodness? 
"Wait!" you will say. "You judge me unfairly. I see that if I could 
have created a maximally good world I might be subject to some crit-
icism here for creating a world so limited in value as world 1. But 
there is no maximally good world. So clearly I'm perfectly justified in 
creating the poorest in the infinite series of increasingly better worlds. 
You should not have any doubts at all about my being perfectly good!" 
Surely this defense of one's "perfect goodness" is woefully inadequate. A 
perfectly good being cannot, consistent with its perfect goodness, con-
sciously elect to create the least good world when there is an infinite num-
ber of increasingly better worlds as available for creation as the least good 
world. But it is just this conclusion that Morris's position would require us 
to accept. Since the conclusion is clearly false, if not absurd, we should 
reject it. Instead, we should say that the degree of goodness an omniscient 
being possesses is reflected in the degree of goodness in the world it cre-
ates. And what this reasoning leads us to is the conclusion Leibniz reached: 
An unsurpassably good, omnipotent, omniscient creator will create an 
unsurpassably good world. Indeed, unsurpassable goodness in an 
omnipotent, omniscient world-creator is consistent only with the creation 
of an unsurpassably good world. For there is an impossibility in the idea 
both that there exists an infinite series of increasingly better creatable 
worlds and that there also exists an unsurpassably good, omnipotent, 
omniscient being who creates one of these worlds. 
The conclusion we've just reached points to an incompatibility between 
the necessary existence of the theistic God and the possibility Morris 
embraces: that the series of increasingly better creatable worlds goes on to 
infinity. But how could a mere possibility be inconsistent with the exis-
tence of the theistic God? After all, isn't it one thing to conclude that God's 
infinite perfection precludes his actualizing a bad possible world, and 
quite another thing to conclude that God's infinite perfection precludes 
there even being such a thing as a bad possible world? And if God's exis-
tence doesn't rule out bad possible worlds, why should it rule out an infi-
nite series of increasingly better possible worlds? The answer to these 
questions consists in seeing that if God necessarily exists and is necessari-
ly such that whatever world is actual can be so only by virtue of his creat-
ing it, then since it is impossible for God (an absolutely perfect being) to 
create a bad world, there cannot be any bad worlds. In short, given God's 
necessary perfections and necessary existence, the only possible, non-actu-
al worlds are worlds God can create. And once we see that given God's 
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necessary existence and necessary perfections no world creatable by God 
can be a bad world, we are well on our way to seeing that it is likewise 
impossible that there should be an unending series of increasingly better 
creatable worlds. 
Morris nicely captures the essence of the view I've just described by not-
ing that such a God "is a delimiter of possibilities." 
If there is a being who exists necessarily, and is necessarily omnipo-
tent, omniscient, and good, then many states of affairs which other-
wise would represent genuine possibilities, and by all non-theistic 
tests of logic and semantics do represent possibilities, are strictly 
impossible in the strongest sense. In particular, worlds containing 
certain sorts or amounts of disvalue or evil are metaphysically ruled 
out by the nature of God, divinely precluded from the realm of real 
possibility.32 
Return now to our earlier contention that possible worlds include very 
good worlds, neutral worlds, and very bad worlds. In addition we suggest-
ed that just as for every good world there is a better possible world, so too 
for every bad world there is a possible world whose degree of badness is 
greater. Morris will allow that such worlds are "conceivable." But since he 
holds that God is a delimiter of possibilities and that it is impossible for God 
to create a world that is a bad world, the bad worlds we conceive of are 
not, at least for the theist, genuinely possible. For the only way such worlds 
could be genuinely possible is for it to be possible for God to create them. 
But God's perfect nature necessarily precludes him from creating such 
worlds. Therefore, such worlds aren't really possible all things considered. 
Morris's general point here strikes me as sound. If p is necessarily true 
and q is inconsistent with p, then, even though we can conceive of q and q 
seems to us to be paradigm case of a genuine possibility, q isn't really pos-
sible at all. So, if there is a necessarily perfect being who necessarily exists, 
then even though we can conceive of a bad world, that bad world is really 
not a possible world provided that for a world to be actual it must be actual-
ized by the necessarily perfect being. Consider, for example, a world in 
which nearly all the sentient beings have lives so full of suffering that it 
would be better had they never existed. Such a world is a bad world. Is this 
world, so understood, a possible world? It certainly seems to be. But given 
that a possible world can be actual only if it is created by a necessarily per-
fect being, and such a being necessarily exists, then that world really isn't a 
possible world, it only seems to be possible. Of course, what is sauce for 
the goose (Morris) is sauce for the gander (Rowe). If this bad world, which 
certainly seems to be possible, really is a possible world, then it is simply 
impossible that there is a necessarily perfect being who is necessarily the cre-
ator of any world that is actual. Which then are we more sure of: that some 
bad world is genuinely possible or that there necessarily exists a being who 
is necessarily omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly good? The former is a 
"delimiter of necessities" just as the latter is a "delimiter of possibilities." 
Just as what is necessary precludes certain "possibilities," so does what is 
possible preclude certain "necessities." The theist begins with the neces-
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sary existence of a being who is essentially perfect and concludes that a 
bad world isn't even a possibility. The non-theist begins with the possibili-
ty of there being a bad world and concludes that there is no essentially per-
fect being who necessarily exists. 
Suppose we accept Morris's view about God as a delimiter of possibili-
ties. Suppose, that is, that we agree with him that if there is a being who 
exists necessarily, and is necessarily omnipotent, omniscient, and good, 
then many states of affairs which otherwise would have been possible are 
strictly impossible. If so, then if there is such a being we should agree that 
there are no possible worlds that are overall bad worlds. For such a world 
is possible only if it is possible for God to actualize that world. But God's 
necessary perfections preclude him from actualizing it. Therefore, such a 
world is not really a possible world. 
Having adopted Morris's view that God is a delimiter of possibilities, 
suppose we now return to the stalemate between the view I've argued for: 
It is impossible for God to exist and create an inferior world when he could 
have created a better world; 
and the view my opponent maintains: 
God is free to create some good world even though there is an unlimited 
number of better worlds anyone of which he could have created instead. 
My opponent may well agree with me that given God's absolute perfection 
God could not create a world less than the best world. In short, if there is a 
best world all things considered, we may both agree with Leibniz and 
Clarke that God will necessarily create that world. (Of course, there remains 
the problem of explaining the precise sense in which God could be free in 
creating the best possible world.) It is only when we come to the no best 
world scenario that our views clash so profoundly. But Morris, perhaps 
unwittingly, has shown us a way to resolve the problem. God is the ulti-
mate delimiter of possibilities. Thus, if God exists the series of increasingly 
good possible worlds has a limit - the best possible world. A creator that is 
necessarily good could not possibly create a less than good world. So, given 
that this being is a delimiter of possibilities, there are no possible worlds 
that are not good worlds. Furthermore, a necessarily perfect being could not 
possibly create a world that is less good than some other world it could cre-
ate. So, given that this being creates a world and is a delimiter of possibili-
ties, the world he creates cannot be one than which there is a better creat-
able world. Thus, following the path that Morris has pointed out, we con-
clude that God's necessary existence and necessary perfections would rule 
out two seeming possibilities: (1) there being possible worlds that are bad; 
(2) there being no best possible world. If God exists, his necessary existence 
and necessary perfections rule out the apparent existence of possible worlds 
that are bad as well as the apparent possibility that for any world God can 
create there is a better world he could create. What then should we con-
clude about the actual world? We should conclude that if the theistic God 
does exist, the actual world is the best possible world.33 And therein lies the 
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seeds of another argument against the existence of the God of traditional 
theism. For however much we may succeed in trying to fit the terrible evils 
in our world into some rational plan, few are prepared to think with Leibniz 
that this world is as good as any world could possibly be. 
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